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1J 
IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
OF THE STA-l'E OF UTAH 
ALICE )lAE BUCK, 
Plaintiff-A ppclla 11 t. ) 
vs. Case No. 
I 10595 
EDYVIN HOLT BUCK, )
1 
Defendant-Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for an annulment and to deter-
mine what the parties contributed to the acquisition of 
the estate and to determine an equitable distribution 
of the accumulated property. 
1 
DISPOSITION MADE OF THE CASE IN 
THE LO,VER COURT 
This case was tried before the Honorable Merrill 
C. Faux, District Judge, sitting without a jury. At 
the opening of the trial, the court granted the annul-
ment based upon the decree theretofore rendered by 
the Honorable Stewart 1\1. Hanson, District Judge, 
and upon the stipulation of plaintiff and defendant. 
The court then proceeded to hear four days of testi· 
mony and two concluding arguments, together with 
two subsequent arguments, on the law and the evi· 
dence, held on the 28th day of October, 1965 (at the 
instance of the court), and again on the 21st day 
of December, 1965 (upon the motion of plaintiff). 
The court then granted plaintiff the sum of $31,957.43, 
less the sum of $7,214.00, received by plaintiff from 
defendant in the year prior to judgment, viz. the sum 
of $24,742.73, together with interest at 6% from the 
16th day of October, 1964, to November 29, 1965. 
The court determined that said sum was an equitabie 
distribution of the property acquired through the joint 
efforts of the plaintiff and defendant during their co· 
habitation. Plaintiff appealed from the decision and 
defendant cross-appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant seeks 
a reduction in the amount awarded to plaintiff-appel· 
2 
Iant from the sum of $31,957.43 to not more than the 
sum of $10,203.04 without interest. 
STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS 
In the early part of October, 1964, plaintiff left 
defendant and the home where the parties had been 
living for years and thereafter sued defendant for 
divorce (Tr. 317). Defendant answered and then moved 
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground that no 
marriage existed. The motion was granted (Tr. I and 
2), and a decree of annulment was entered, and the 
matter came on to be heard on the 7th day of October, 
1965. The only questions remaining to be determined 
were: I) the amount contributed to the acquisition of 
the property by each of the parties, and 2) an equitable 
distribution of the property acquired during the co-
habitation. 
Plaintiff and defendant cohabited as man and wife 
from the 17th day of March, 1945, to on or about the 
18th day of October, 1964, when plaintiff absented 
herself from the residence where the parties had been 
living and did not return (Tr. 317). 
Plaintiff was a divorcee with two children at the 
time she purportedly married l\ilr. Buck and knew, 
at the time of the purported marriage, that his divorce 
was not final (Tr. 392) . 
Appro~imately one year after the purported mar-
riage, in the spring of 1946, plaintiff and defendant 
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moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, where Mr. Buck pur. 
chased a beer tavern (Tr. 302-303). Shortly there. 
after a lot was purchased, then a residence, shares 01 
stock: a duplex and then the real property on whid 
the tavern is located (Tr. 302-304). The acquisition 
cost of all of this property was $108,200.88 (Tr. 307) 
Defendant invested his inherited capital, together witi: 
its increment, in the property. (Tr. 210, 215, 292-299). 
Defendant managed and controlled all properti 
and investments (Tr. 25, 305, 306, 405, 408, 323, 319). 
and plaintiff, in addition to keeping house for herseli 
and defendant, worked on some occasions at the tavern 
(Tr. 118). Defendant cared for one of the children of 
plaintiff at his home for a time (Tr. 175, 197), ana 
provided employment for the husband (Ted Thorstead 1 
of the other child of plaintiff (Tr. 314, 157). 
Throughout the period of cohabitation, defendanl 
provided plaintiff with a comfortable living above the 
average (Tr. 118, 174-175, 337-338, 340-341). The 
parties were able to and did live well above the average 
Defendant-respondent and cross-appellant dis· 
agrees with the statement of facts of plaintiff-appellan! 
where it is said, "they purchased a tavern" (Tr. 301· 
303); where it is stated that only the first small amounh 
of stock purchased came from assets the defendant hao 
at the time of the marriage and that thereafter money 
for the stocks came from joint earnings (Tr. 210). 
that "there was some small income received from the 
California property" (Tr. 295-296, Ex. 15-D), the im· 
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plication that the business was built by both of them, 
and the implication that defendant depleted the estate 
by his drinking, gambling and ownership of Cadillacs 
--it is believed that the many parts of the evidence 
referred to in the argument, infra, will prohibit any 
credence being given to such an implication; that plain-
tiff has received only $6,909. 70 since she left defendant 
(Tr. 256, 258, 261, 359) ; that defendant ever admitted 
"waking up in Denver and not knowing how he got to 
Denver." 
Since the 18th day of October, 1964, the date 
plaintiff left defendant, plaintiff has received from 
defendant the sum of $7,214.00 (Tr. 256, 258, 261, 
359 and the lower court's order of December 21, 1965). 
POINT I. THE DISTRIBUTION IN 
EQUITY ~1ADE TO PLAINTIFF-APPEL-
LANT IS EXCESSIVE AND NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY THE LA ,V. 
Under our law, the marriage relationship is one of 
complete mutuality, and unless each party is wholly 
and completely bound by marriage, neither party is 
married nor in any way bound to the other. There are 
no degrees of marriage. 
Our court in Jenkins v . .T enkin.Y, 107 Utah 239, 
153 P. 2d 262, said: 
Under Section -i0-1-17, U.C.A. 1943, the court 
clearly had _the au~hority to declare the pur-
ported marf!age v01d. 'Vhere the marriage has 
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been entered into in good faith by both parties 
or where, as here, both parties knew of the inter-
locutory. decree of divorce which had not yet be. 
come final, the court in the exercise of its equit. 
able power has jurisdiction to require an equit-
able distribution of the property acquired during 
the time the litigants were cohabiting as man and 
wife. 
Although the court in the Jenkins case was not 
called upon to decide what form an equitable distribu-
tion should take, some of the cases which it cited did 
so, and in all of them from states where, (as in our 
own), the common law is the general rule of decision, 
the guidelines for solving the distribution of property 
after a void marriage are set down. 
These guidelines were set down in Fuller v. Fuller, 
33 Kan. 582, 7 P. 241 (1885): 
"It is our opinion, however, that in all judi-
cial separations of persons who have lived to· 
gether as husband and wife, a fair and equitable 
division of their property should be had, and the 
court in making such division should inquire into 
the amount that each party originally owned, 
the amount each party received while they wert 
livin.g together, and the amount of their joinl 
accumulations." (Emphasis supplied). 
That the stated points of inquiry are the guideline1 
is amply demonstrated by a long line of cases from 
many jurisdictions from the date of the Fuller case 
to the present. In all of these cases the contributiom 
of the parties are scrutinized. 
6 
In the case of Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 
53 P. 127 ( 1898), the court said: 
\Vhile Emil Y\T erner had considerable prop-
erty at the time of the marriage and Rosa had 
none, the testimony tends to show that the prop-
erty which they have now is largely the result 
of their join labor and earnings. She was active, 
industrious and faithful and besides household 
work, she was an effici,ent aid in conducting and 
carrying on the different branches of business in 
which he was engaged. In the early days she 
performed labor of the hardest and most menial 
character and throughout the 22 years in which 
they lived together as husband and wife she was 
diligent, tireless and econornical in building up 
a business and in gathering up the property 
which they held at the time of the trial. She 
appears to have been a valuable assistant in man-
aging the business and in caring for the prop-
erty in which their earnings were invested. A 
portion of the time the title to the property was 
in her name, but at the time of the separation 
he held the legal title to most of it. The fact, 
however, that the legal title stood in the name 
of one or of the other of the parties does not 
prevent a just distribution of the property 
jointly contributed and in fact jointly owned by 
both. (Emphasis supplied). 
Certainly it cannot be said of plaintiff in the case 
here for decision that she was "active, industrious and 
fatihful"; that "she was an efficient aid in conducting 
anc] carrying on the different branches of business" in 
which l\Ir. Buck was engaged. Nor, it is submitted, 
does the record show her to be "diligent, tireless and 
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economical" or "a valuable assistant in managing the 
business and in caring for the property in which * * * 
earnings were invested." Alice Buck had no earnings 
and invested no money in the property. The purported 
Mrs. Buck did what she wanted to (Tr. 388). She 
didn't earn money, she spent it. She didn't manage 
the business, she used it. (Tr. 309, 311, 312.) She ob-
jected to the purchase of the tavern, and the realty 
on which it is located (Tr. 238, 308). 
In the case of Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash, 213, 
96 P. 1079, 1082 (1908), the court found that the 
plaintiff there had helped acquire and save the property 
and said, " ... the court had authority to decree ... 
the division of the property which has been jointl,Y 
accumulated by the parties." (Emphasis supplied). 
Alice Buck objected to the purchase of the business 
(Tr. 308) and to the purchase of the realty on which 
the business stands (Tr. 238) . 
In the case of Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 
441, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 844 (1911), the court held that 
where the purported wife had contributed to the acqui· 
sitions of the parties after marriage and before annul· 
ment, she was entitled to a share. It is interesting to 
note that the jurisdiction of the Coats case is one where 
the common law is not the basis for general decision 
for property rights acquired during a purported mar· 
riage, and even then, the court adhered to the contribu· 
tion theory. 
In the case of Batty v. Green, (Mass.) 92 N.E. 715 
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( 1910), the litigants made joint contributions to a fund 
from which property \vas purchased, and the court found 
that because of the joint contributions an equitable divi-
sion would be had. A master determined the fractional 
contributions of the parties to the whole and the award 
was made on that basis. Again, it is to be noted that in 
the Buck case there was no joint fund and plaintiff-
appellant Buck contributed no funds and that her con-
tribution in \vork was small indeed compared to the con-
tribution of l\Ir. Buck (Tr. 309, 316, 324-325). 
Another Massachusetts case, Morin v. Kirkland, 115 
N.E. 414 ( 1917) tells the story of a void marriage where 
the plaintiff mingled her wages with the money she 
received from the purported husband for household 
expenses. Realty was purchased with this money and 
upon the death of the purported husband, the court held 
the property to be hers. Plaintiff-appellant Buck had 
no wages, and mingled no funds (Tr. 39-40). 
In re Brenchley, 96 Wash. 223, 164 P. 913 (1917), 
<lepicted a situation where the purported wife kept 
borders and a lodging house and was a nurse and a mid-
wife and contributed her earnings to the payment of the 
obligations which purchased the property which was the 
subject for division. Because of the contributions she 
made from her individual earnings, the court made an 
award to the purported wife. 
Knoll v. Knoll, 104 'iVash. 110, 176 P. 22 (1918). 
Here the court found that the purported wife had faith-
fully performed all the duties of a housewife; she had 
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worked as a seamstress; she had provided for her ou,
11 
expenses, and that the property was acquired by the 
joint efforts of the parties, and the court held that if she 
had not supported herself the husband would have hao 
to do it. On such bases the court made its award. Tht 
attention of the court is directed to the fact that not 
only was plaintiff-appellant Buck supported by Mr. 
Buck, but she was supported in a fashion well above tht 
average; and. that plaintiff-appellant Buck had no out· 
side employment. 
Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okl. 30, 190 P. 1088 (19201. 
In this case the court made an equitable division of tht 
property where it was shown that at the time of tht 
purported marriage the parties had no property bul 
worked and toiled together for 15 years, saving aboui 
$16,000 over and above their indebtedness. The court 
also found that the woman assisted in accumulating the 
property which was acquired by the savings of therr 
joint efforts. Again, the court's attention is directed tu 
the fact that at the inception of the purported Buel 
marriage, Mr. Buck had substantial assets, his purportec 
wife had none; and that such joint efforts there wert 
were small indeed compared to the individual effort oi 
Mr. Buck. 
In the year 1921 another Washington case, Power' 
v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 P. 1080, found that tni 
purported wife had received in her own name a paten 
to certain lands upon which she had filed a timber anr 
stone claim. Because she had made a contribution to tDi 
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acquisition of the property, the court allowed her such 
portion of the property as to which she was equitably 
and justly entitled. 
An interesting void marriage case is that of Fung 
Dai Kim Ah Leony v. Lau Ah Leong, (1928) (C.A. 
9th Hawaii) 27 F.2d 582, Cert. den., 278 U.S. 636, 73 
L. ed 552, 49 S.Ct. 33, wherein the plaintiff and a man 
entered into a joint marriage. 'Vhen their association 
began, the man was penniless. With money contributed 
{Jy the woman a business was begun which resulted in the 
accumulation of several hundred thousand dollars. The 
court in setting out the formula for distribution said, 
"Here, we think, it will be proper for the court . . . 
to take into consideration the relative contributions of 
property, and of personal service in point of value, made 
by the two parties in the accumulation of the property 
standing in the defendant's name, the amount and value 
of such propert.11 at the time their defacto marital rela-
tionB ceased, the amount of property accumulated by 
plaintiff during the same period and standing in her 
name, ... " In the Fung Dai case the woman worked 
long and hard and provided money for the man to get 
his start. This, of course, is the diametric opposite of the 
situation obtaining between ~Ir. Buck and his purported 
wife. 
The case of Reese v. Reese, 132 Kan. 438, 295 P. 
690 ( 1931) was a case where the putative wife contrib-
uted funds previously given her in a property settlement, 
and from an inheritance, which funds were directly chan-
11 
neled into the man's business ; s~he also assisted him in 
other ways. On this state of facts the court made an 
award to the woman based upon the amount of her 
contributions. In the Reese case the contributions of 
the woman were substantial, but in the Buck case, it is 
submitted, they certainly do not meet such a test. 
An Indiana case decided in 1942 was that of Sclam-
ber v. Sclamber, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801, wherein, 
at the time of the marriage, the court found the man had 
$47,750 and owed $23,000. When the parties separated 
11 years later, the man had $21,750 and owed $5,.500. 
During this time the woman performed the usual dutie~ 
of a housewife, she was economical, and aided and 
assisted the man in reducing his indebtedness by $17,450, 
for which she received no compensation. The court said 
she was entitled to equitable relief and gave her a judg· 
ment of $1,000. In the Buck case the testimony is to the 
effect that not only was plaintiff-appellant Buck well· 
maintained, but that she was the consistent recipient of 
large sums of money and the beneficiary of many trips. 
The case of King v. Jackson, 196 Okl. 327, 164 P.2d 
97 4 ( 1945) again leans heavily on the guidelines set 
forth in the Fuller case. The court found the evidence 
of the woman convincing to the effect that during most 
of the time she had lived with her purported husband 
she was actively employed as a teacher, worked as a 
domestic and contributed most of her money toward 
acquiring and improving the property in question. The 
court decreed to her an award of one-half interest but 
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impressed her judgment ·with an amount equal to one-
half the taxes paid by the defendant. 
The case of Schwartz v. United States, (Maryland) 
l!H F.2d 618 ( 1915), involved a situation wherein the 
purported wife of a void marriage purchased with her 
own rnone,11 land which was conveyed to her and her pur-
ported husband by a deed intended to convey an estate 
by the entireties. Because of her total contribution, the 
title to the land was impressed with a trust in her favor. 
The California void marriage cases are interesting 
because when they divide the property equally they do 
so because they subscribe to a rule which denotes accu-
mulated property as quasi-community property pur-
suant to the influence of the Spanish law. The case cited 
by plaintiff-appellant, viz., Schneider v. Schneider, I83 
Cal. 335, 191 P. 533, II A.L.R. I386 ( I920), is an 
example. Earlier cases have based their decision on the 
common law and the contribution theory of which Coats 
, .. Coats, supra, is an example. The later California 
('.ases do not subscribe to the equal division theory. Such 
a case is that of Keene v. J(eene, 2I Cal. Rep. 593, 37I 
P.2d 329 ( 1962). In addressing itself to the question of 
what are joint contributions, or contributions sufficient 
to entitle a woman to participate in a share of the prop-
erty, the court in referring to Vallera v. Vallera, 2I 
C.2d 681, I34 P.2d 76I, 763, said: 
If a man and woman live together as husband 
and wife under an agreement to pool their earn-
ings and share equally in their joint accumula-
13 
tions, equity will protect the interests of each 
in such property (citations). Even in the ab. 
sence of an express agreement to that effect the 
woman would be entitled to share in the prop. 
erty jointly accumulated in the proportion that 
her funds contributed towards acquisition ( cita. 
tions) ". (Emphasis supplied). ':Ve do not 
depart from that proposition but here the 
trial court found as stated in its memorandum 
decision, "no evidence of financial contribu. 
tions by plaintiff toward the property here con-
cerned nor is there evidence sufficient to sup-
port any agreement upon which a joint enter· 
prise or co-partnership could be based". In an 
effort to bring her case nevertheless within the 
purview of the just quoted language from 
V allera, plaintiff stresses a finding of the trial 
court concerning the nature of her services dur· 
ing the period of co-habitation, and on this bas~ 
contends that in Vallera "When it used the wora 
'funds' the court did not mean 'money' only. 
It referred to any contribution made by the 
woman, at least to any contribution other than 
her services as a housekeeper, cook and home· 
maker for which she may have been compensated 
either wholly or in part by support furnished. 
The contention is without merit. When a word 
is used which has a well established meaning iu 
common parlance such as "funds" the necessities 
of intelligible communications require that it 
be assumed that the user intended that common 
meaning. There is no mystery surrounding the 
word here mentioned questioned by plaintiff. 
The dictionary defines it as "available pecuniary 
resources ordinarily including cash and nego~ 
tiable paper", ('Vebsters New International 
Dictionary 3rd Ed. 1961, page 921), and in a 
14 
legal coutext the courts have also taken it to 
include property of value which may be con-
verted into cash (citing cases). A simple reading 
of both the Yallera opinions demonstrates that 
the members of the court intended and under-
&tood the word "funds" to be used in this com-
mon everyday sense. Indeed the dissenting 
opinion in \T allera expressly stated it to be "the 
conclusion of the majority opinion that in order 
to sustain the judgment of the trial court, there 
must be proof of a definite monetary contribu-
tion by the plaintiff in the form of separate 
property or a contribution of her earnings as a 
waitress or from other employment outside the 
home." (Italics added) (Cases cited). Plain-
tiff's reliance on subsequent decisions of this 
Court and the District Court of Appeal wl}~ch 
cite Y all era is misplaced, as none extends the 
word 'funds' beyond its intended, commonsense . ,, 
meanmg. 
Another recent case dealing with this problem is 
that of Anderson t'. Stncker, ( ~Iissouri Report Offi-
eially not published) 317 S."\V.2d 417 (1958). The court 
there had under cons id era tion property which had been 
conveyed to plaintiff and defendant as husband and 
wife, although they were not married, and the decision 
•ms that a tenancy in common ·was created. But since 
there was no proof that the woman had contributed any 
sum to the purchase price or to the payment of notes 
secured by trust deeds on the property, the man was 
entitled to judgment quieting title to the real property 
in him, subject to an adjustment for repairs and im-
provements made by the woman. " ... Upon this record 
it VW.IJ only be said in accordance with the general 
15 
rule, that the trial court has f01.md and apportioned 
the interests of the pm·ties proportionately to their 
contributions to its acquisition. . . . Subject to an 
adjustment for repairs and improvements, the judg-
ment quieting the title to the real property in (the 
man) is affirmed and remanded; . . . " ( Emphasi~ 
supplied). It is to be noted that in the Stacker case 
the woman advanced some $300 for the purpose of im-
provements and repairs. In addition, she worked all 
during the purported marriage at a job away from 
home. 
Some talk has been made by plaintiff-appellant 
about the joint tenancy property. The plain answer to 
this is to be found on pages 341-343 of the transcript. 
The defendant said: 
Q. Why are they in joint tenancy? 
A. Well, I figured that Alice was my wife. She 
kept-she always figured that she was (gypped) 
in life and she was worried about that, if some· 
thing happened to me, if she was going to get 
what I had, and there was arguments-argu· 
ments-so I decided to put these in her name; 
but she never had any custody of them. 
They were in the Savings-Deposit box in my 
name ; all they were doing is protecting her in 
case I would die; then, the Safety-Deposit box 
be opened up and it could be given to her. 
Q. Did you-were these stocks always in joint 
tenancy? 
A. To begin with, I bought them in my name: 
not these, but others. 
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Q. \Yas this a voluntary action on your part 
that you put them in joint tenancy? 
A. I would say not so, but I had to have peace 
and quietness in the house. 
Q. \Vhy wouldn't you have peace and quietness 
in the house ? 
A. She wanted protection in case I died; so, 
to have peace and quietness, I gave her protec-
tion in case I died, by putting her name on my 
stocks. 
Q. \Vhat would she do when her name wasn't 
on the stocks? 
A. She would pout. I bought a couple of shares 
of Budd and different things. She would pout, 
and, when the dividend checks would come, she 
would look at me nastily and throw them on the 
kitchen table. "This is your stock," she would 
say. 
It is submitted that the only tenable determination 
which can be made is that the property in question was 
placed in joint tenancy under the mistaken belief of 
Mr. Buck that plaintiff-appellant was his wife. 
Facts similar to those in the Buck case, involving 
a Mexico divorce and a mistaken gift, were developed 
in the case of Wood v. Wood, 245 NYS 800, 826 and 
41 Misc. 2d 95, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1259 (1963). The New 
York court, at page 826, said: 
The fourth counterclaim relates to the "joint 
ownership" of the apartment. The defendant 
bought the apartment on March 31, 1960 for 
$165,000.00; on December 19, 1961, with the 
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consent of the Landlord Corpora.tion (effective 
January 1, 1962), he transferred the ownership 
from himself to "Walter A. Wood and Helena 
A. Wood, his wife, as joint tenants with right 
of survivorship". The transfer was by way of 
outright gift. The defendant, on the assumption 
his marriage is annulled, asks to have the prop-
erty restored to him. He does so on the ground 
that the transfer was made in the belief that he 
was validly married to the plaintiff; that he 
otherwise would not have done so. I think he is 
entitled to the relief he asks. It is unthinkable 
that the gift would have been made, except for 
a belief in a subsisting marriage. It was already 
the matrimonial home; the plaintiff called it 
"her home" at least during her lifetime without 
any documents of title and it was only because 
she was believed to be the wife, entitled to the 
"security" of a wife, that the transfer was made. 
To be sure the defendant did not say in so many 
words that he would not have made the transfer 
if he had not believed the plaintiff was legally 
his wife. His assertion to that effect would not 
be determinative; but the absence of a strict 
formula here should not prejudice him. It was 
not any statement by the plaintiff upon which 
he relied in making the transfer. That was done 
upon a mistaken belief as to his status. Both 
believed the relationship to be that of husband 
and wife; there was no fraud upon the part of 
either one-but there were no equities in favor 
of the wife such as existed in American Surety 
Co. of New York v. Conner, 251 NY 1, 166 N.E. 
783, 65 ALR 244. 
POINT II. THE DISTRIBUTION IN 
EQUITY MADE TO PLAINTIFF-APPEL· 
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J,ANT IS EXCESSIVE AND NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The principal question is what contributions to the 
acquisition of the property 'Yere made by plaintiff and 
<lef endant. 
There is no question that defendant brought with 
him, at the time of the purported marriage, assets 
amounting to at Jeast $34,400.00 to $36,400.00. These 
consisted of: 
Rental property inherited from his mother situated 
in Long Beach California (Tr. 292) 
Bonds from money inherited from his mother with 
a face value of (Tr. 293) 
Bank account consisting of income from rental prop-
erty and other money deposited in the Farmers and 
Merchants Bank, Long Beach, Celifornia 
(Tr. 298) 4,000 
Water bond from his inheritance (Tr. 298, 199) 
$14,400.00 
15,000.00 
to 6,000.00 
1,000.00 
$34,400 to $36,400.00 
In the succeeding years of this association, from 
1946 to 1963, the income from the rental property 
m Long Beach amounted to another 27,371.26 
\Tr. 295, 296. Ex. 15-D and income tax returns) 
Bank interest and stock dividends accruing in the 
succeeding years of the association added another 23,014. 76 
I.Tr. 296, 297, Ex. 16-D) 
$ 50,386.02 
'Yhen the parties moved to Salt Lake City, defend-
ant purchased a beer tavern with money from his in-
heritance (Tr. 302, 303). In addition, the defendant 
pmchased a building lot for $700.00 in the early part 
of 1947 with money from his inheritance (Tr. 300, 301). 
In 1948 a residence was purchased, and the down pay-
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ment made consisted of $4,000.00 in bonds from his 
mother's inheritance and the lot for which he received a 
credit of $1,000.00 (Tr. 301, 302). 
Thereafter, beginning in about 1954, defendant 
began investing his money in corporate stocks. On page 
305 of the transcript he says: 
" ... I finally took all my savings out and 
all my money in the safety deposit box tha: 
wasn't working for me, and I put it aH in stock." 
Under examination by plaintiff's counsel (Tr. 210) in 
answer to the question of where the money to buy the 
stocks came from, defendant said, 
" . . . from income off the property in Cali· 
fornia; from interest that I had in the banks; 
I had money in the banks. I had money in differ· 
ent banks. I had money in the Prudential Bank. 
I had money in the Continental Bank that I had 
spread around from my Long Beach property: 
also the accumulation of interest; that is what 
I bought the stocks with." 
The defendant bought and traded the stocks (Tr. 306). 
He was the manager and business head in the acquisi· 
tion of the stock portfolio. Plaintiff admits he bought 
and sold the stocks (Tr. 25). But in other testimony, 
plaintiff says she purchased and sold various stocks 
(Tr. 26). This last statement is categorically denied on 
direct and cross-examination by witness Healy, the 
account executive who handled all of defendant's stock 
business (Tr. 438, 439). 
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The realty on which the tavern business was con-
ducted was purchased in 1963 for $34,500.00, and in 
answer to the question, " ... and do you recall how the 
money was put together to buy that?", defendant said: 
"'Ve sold some stocks that was in both our 
names. I sold some stock that was in my name, 
and I also drew around $4,000.00 cash from 
the bank in my name." (Tr. 302-304). 
In 1957 a duplex was purchased for $5,500.00 cash, 
and defendant said he had savings accounts sufficient 
to make the purchase (Tr. 303). 
The testimony of all the witnesses, it is submitted, 
confirms two statements made by defendant - 1) on 
examination by adverse counsel, viz.: 
"I would never have had any of this stuff if 
I hadn't had bonds to begin." (Tr. 241). 
and 2) on direct examination: 
" ... we wouldn't have had anything if it 
wasn't for the inheritance." (Tr. 345). 
'VHAT 'VAS DEFENDANT'S CONTRIB-
UTION IN 'VORK AT THE BEER TAV-
ERN? 
Defendant has operated the business from the 
time it opened to the present and is yet operating it 
(Tr. 308). From the opening of the business to the 
present, defendant has worked a shift at the business 
in addition to all the other duties which devolved upon 
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him as the manager (Tr. 319) - the bookkeeping, the 
maintenance, the janitor work, the gardening work, 
purchasing. None of this testimony is denied, neither 
directly nor inferentially. 
The defendant testified that during the years l94ti 
(the inception of the business) and 1953 he worked a! 
the tavern as a bartender for at least forty hours :1 
week, and in the performance of other duties connecteo 
with the management of the enterprise at least thirt) 
additional hours a week; that between the years 195i 
and 1959 he spent at least thirty-two hours a week therr 
as a bartender and thirty-five additional hours a wed; 
in performance of his other duties; that between 195[1 
and October 18, 1964, the date plaintiff left defendanl 
(Tr. 317), he spent at least twenty-four hours a wee~ 
as a bartender and forty additional hours a week in tl1e 
performance of his other duties; that from the 18th 01 
October, 1964, to the time of the tiral he worked at tht 
tavern as a bartender for thirty hours a week and ai1 
additional forty hours per week in performing his other 
duties, which always consisted of keeping the books. 
opening the business every day, pulling weeds, watering, 
scrubbing the floors, painting, buying records for tht 
juke box and putting them on, purchasing supplies, 
keeping abreast of current business affairs to enablt 
him to regulate his business, and checking on his em· 
ployees to see what was going on (Tr. 325 through 3271 
The defendant's testimony in this regard is confirmeil 
by all the witnesses who were at the tavern throughout 
the nineteen years of ten enough to know. 
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.Mr. Sheridan, whose employment began in 1946, 
sa~·s that :Mr. Buck worked regular shifts at that time, 
and that plaintiff did not work on a regular basis (Tr. 
395, 400), and that she was at the tavern more often as 
u customer. 
Again, Robert Gull, who was employed at the 
tavern from 1958 to 1963, testified that Mr. Buck was 
at the tavern every morning, and when the business 
was without a day bartender, he would take his place; 
that .Mr. Buck many times worked a full shift, and that 
:Mr. Buck did not spend very much time away from 
the Buckeroo (Tr. 419, 421). He also stated that the 
work of plaintiff at the tavern was of no great extent, 
and that the only time she worked was when she relieved 
Mr. Buck (Tr. 419). 
'V"itness Thatcher stated, on cross-examination, 
that, 
"It was l\'[r. Buck who took care of the whole 
business, who did everything necessary to be 
done," 
that "he was there all the time" (Tr. 405, 408). She also 
testified that plaintiff was never there on a regular basis, 
and that plaintiff was there more often as a customer 
than as a worker (Tr. 405). 
\Vitness Tolman, a frequent customer at the tavern, 
testified that Mr. Buck was always there checking on 
something (Tr. 444). 
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NO,V, 'VHAT 'VAS PLAINTIFF'S COX. 
TRIBUTION TO THE ACQUISITION OF 
THE PROPERTY? 
Plaintiff herself testified that at the time she and 
Mr. Buck first came to Salt Lake City from California 
she had no assets or other things of value, and during 
the entire time she cohabited with Mr. Buck she had 
no outside employment; that she was not paid any wage~ 
from anyone other than Mr. Buck; that she hadn't 
received any money (other than from Mr. Buck) from 
anyone else; and that she did not " ... invest any of (her) 
own funds in any of the property" acquired by Mr. 
Buck. Her answer was, 
"NT f f' d " (T 40) one o my own un s. r. . 
She further stated, in answer to a question from her 
counsel, that there was no co-mingling of her fund, 
with those of :Mr. Buck prior to coming to Salt Lake 
City (Tr. 39). She did attempt to establish that she 
had $700 in cash in her purse when she arrived in Sall 
Lake City. She later stated that she 
" ... spent my money-what I had-on clothe~ 
and on-when we first came here, we just hao 
the suitcase; ... " (Tr. 70). 
Shortly after their arrival in Salt Lake City, the 
plaiutiff was hospitalized, and Mr. Buck paid the hos· 
pital bills. He testified that she never told him abou! 
this purported $700, not then or in all the years of thf 
association ( Tr. 300) . 
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THE PLAINTIFF HAVING MADE NO 
CONTRIBUTION IN FUNDS TOWARD THE 
ACQUISITION OF THE BUSINESS, THE 
RESIDENCE, THE DUPLEX, THE STOCKS, 
OR THE REALTY ON WHICH THE BUSI-
NESS IS LOCATED, WHAT WAS HER CON-
TRIBUTION IN '¥ORK TOWARD THE AC-
QuISITION OF THE PROPERTY? 
The trial court correctly found that the acquisition 
of this property is almost entirely because of the efforts 
and contributions of defendant, and that plaintiff had 
nothing to do with the acquisition of, or reinvestment 
of, the stocks; and that "Plaintiff's contribution toward 
the properties acquired during the cohabitation in addi-
tion to well executed duties usually discharged by a 
wife, amounted to help at the Buckeroo Lounge, but not 
on a regular basis during the latter years of their 
cohabitation" (Findings of Fact). It is submitted that 
her work at the lounge was not on a regular basis at any 
time. 
'V"itness Sheridan, one of the first bartenders, stated 
that the plaintiff didn't "pull a regular shift" in 1946; 
that she had a bad effect on the customers when she 
was there; that she was there more often as a customer 
or visitor than as a worker and that she had a mean 
disposition (Tr. 395-397) . This is from a witness who 
worked for Mr. Buck in 1946 and has visited with Mr. 
Buck only once or twice in the ensuing nineteen years. 
This testimony is buttressed by that of other wit-
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nesses who worked at, and frequented the tavern, often 
enough to make reliable observations. 'Vitness Gull 
stated the plaintiff did very little work at the tavern. 
and that she was mean and obnoxious when drunk 
(Tr. 419, 425). The testimony is that the plaintiff wa1 
never there as a worker (Tr. 404); that she was mean 
(Tr. 412) ; that she was vicious (Tr. 442) ; that she used 
foul language (Tr. 452). 
In addition, the testimony is that plaintiff was not 
familiar enough with the operation of the tavern to 
know the prices of the articles sold (Tr. 363) ; that she 
never managed the place (Tr. 309). Mr. Buck's testi· 
mony is that she came down and helped him out between 
April and the first of July in 1946 - that she would 
relieve him for a few hours, and that sometimes she 
worked quite a few hours (Tr. 316). That between 1946 
and 1953, the plaintiff averaged about twenty hours n 
week; and between 1953 and 1959, plaintiff averaged 
about ten hours a week at the tavern; and that from 
1959 to October, 1964, when plaintiff left defendant 
she would have averaged about five hours a week; and 
never at any time was her work at the tavern on a regular 
basis (Tr. 324, 325) . 
The plaintiff attempted to show that the time slit 
worked equaled that of Mr. Buck, and that "recently'' 
she had to work numerous times (Tr. 12, 13). The1~ 
she tried to show that her work at the tavern over tilt 
years was more than that of Mr. Buck (Tr. 55). 
The overwhelming 'veight of the evidence is againi: 
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her, and it appears apparent that the Trial Judge, who 
heard and saw her testify, did not believe her. 
There is testimony to the effect that she was a good 
cook and kept a good house. Certainly this was not a 
difficult task in view of the fact that there were no chil-
dren, no financial worries, and no one to care for but 
herself and ~Ir. Buck. Even at that, she was not such a 
good housewife as to get out of bed to prepare Mr. 
Buck's breakfast (Tr. 53). Plaintiff did what she wanted 
to (Tr. 388). 
HO\V \VAS THE PLAINTIFF TREAT-
ED DURING THE NINETEEN YEARS OF 
THE ASSOCIATION? 
The direct testimony of her witness is: 
"Mr. and Mrs. Buck lived well. They didn't 
deny themselves any of the luxuries that they 
obviously could afford. Mr. Buck had Cadillacs, 
and he liked to make trips, and they had exactly 
what they-to all appearances-had exactly 
what they wished in their home; had a home 
which was well taken care of inside and out, and 
lived and ate and entertained, and, generally, 
lived in a good fashion-in fine fashion." (Tr. 
118). 
The plaintiff's daughter testified that her mother 
and Mr. Buck lived well; that her mother had been 
well taken care of; that she had been supplied with food 
and clothing, entertainment and trips above the average 
that people have. That her mother received gifts of 
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money from .Mr. Buck in the hundreds of dollars (Tr. 
174, 175). 
The plaintiff herself testified that any time she 
asked Mr. Buck for money, he gave it to her; that he 
gave her as much as $500 at a time, and that there were 
other large sums he gave her, and that he gave her 
money for clothes (Tr. 81). She also testified that in 
the beginning he gave her $35 a week for householrl 
expenses; that later on he gave her $50 a week; that 
she didn't have to pay the utilities out of this money: 
that there were just the two of them at home, and that 
in addition to these sums she received other large sums. 
and money any time she asked for it (Tr. 80, 81). ~Ir. 
Buck's testimony is that the only time he ever refuser! 
her was when she asked him for a mink coat. The clothe1 
closets in plaintiff's home were full of her clothing 
(Tr. 335). 
His uncontradicted testimony is also that, except· 
ing those times when her children stayed with them, 
there were just the two of them at home; that they ate 
well; that they went to plays that came to town, movies: 
that he bought her a boat, golf clubs, bowling balls; that 
throughout the period of their association he'd taken her 
out to dinner at least once a week. His statement is: 
" ... maybe, I missed a week, though, sol 
would average it at least once a week, thougl:. 
at the very least." (Tr. 334-337). 
The plaintiff was also the beneficiary of a trip to 
Europe via the Queen lVIary and return via air. Ir. 
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addition to the trip to Europe, there were trips to 
Mexico City, to Yancouver, Washington, "many times 
to California to see her kids ... ",to Las Vegas, to Den-
1·er, to Reno, to San Francisco. Mr. Buck paid all 
the expenses (Tr. 337, 338) . Plaintiff herself testified 
they took trips to California "very frequently" (Tr. 60). 
That he gave her other money in large amounts 
is uncontradicted and corroborated. as is the fact that 
he paid her hospital bills, her dental bills, her medicine 
bills (Tr. 340, 341, 174, 175, 81). 
Other witnesses testified that the plaintiff always 
appeared to be well dressed, and that she never seemed 
to lack for money (Tr. 406, 412, 419, 420, 425, 426). 
THE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPEL-
LANT. 
Plaintiff argues that there is error in allowing 
defendant $70,386.02 as a cash contribution. It is sub-
mitted that the testimony and the exhibits referred to 
amply sustain the court's finding in this regard. 
Plaintiff also argues that defendant should be 
charged with the gambling losses. It is submitted that 
the court correctly found that these balance out each 
other, and the evidence is that plaintiff and her friends 
accompanied him on most of the gambling trips; that 
plaintiff gambled as much as he did, and throughout 
the years of the association he had lost no more than 
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$3,000 and that her losses equaled that figure (Tr. 358i. 
In addition, there is ample testimony showing that jir, 
Buck won large sums of money (Tr. 356, 180). 
Plaintiff also claims defendant's share should bt 
charged with the loss of the 1959 Cadillac. It is error 
to do so in view that the Cadillacs were carried as:, 
business expense and used as a front for the busine.1.1 
The testimony at page 264 of the transcript is: 
Q. During the marriage, Mr. Buck, you hare 
bought many things that you liked yourself thal 
were quite expensive items, such as Cadillac 
automobiles, have you not? 
A. That is business expense. 
Q. \Vell, you have bought them because you 
liked Cadillacs ? 
A. I like business. 
Q 'Vell, the Cadillac doesn't help your busines~ 
does it? 
A. It does. 
Q. In what way? 
A. It is a front. 
Plaintiff's witness testified that because of the higl1 
cost of insurance premiums, Mr. Buck said he was u 
self-insurer (Tr. 120). 
In response to plaintiff's contention that it wa~ 
error on the part of the lower court to find that tbr 
acquisition of the property is almost entirely because ol 
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the efforts and contributions of the defendant, it is 
~ubmitted that the e''idence, just that part of it alluded 
to in this brief by transcript number, conclusively estab-
fo,hes that such is the case. In connection therewith, it 
should be said in answer to plaintiff's statement on page 
10 of her brief to the effect that nearly all the stocks 
were purchased by moneys taken from the net profits 
of the buisness, that it must be apparent from the evi-
dence alluded to, as aforesaid, that nearly all the net 
profits of the Buckeroo business were expended by 
defendant for himself and plaintiff in financing the 
many trips they took, the entertainment they had, the 
above-average standard of living they enjoyed. 
In answer to Point VII of plaintiff's brief with 
respect to the value of the business, defendant directs 
the court's attention to the testimony at pages 73, 7 4, 
i350 and 351 of the transcript. Plaintiff-appellant there 
testifies she didn't know anything about the purported 
offer for the sale of the tavern. Her testimony is: 
Q. . .. who made the offer for the purchase of 
the Buckeroo? 
A. I wasn't there. I was home. Mr. Buck told 
me about it. 
* * * 
Q. Did you favor the sale of the Buckeroo-
A. Yes. 
Q. -to Rey? 
A. Did I what? 
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Q. Did you favor the sale of the Buckeroo for 
$50,000? 
A. Yes; I asked Buck why he didn't take it. 
Q. Did you know anything about Rey's credit. 
rating? 
A. No, he was in there quite often. He was 
speaking of going into business, is all I know. 
I don't know nothing-how would I know? No. 
sir, I don't. 
Q. Yet, you told ~Ir. Buck to go ahead ana 
take it? 
A. 'V ell. he certainly would not have taken it 
if the man hadn't had the money. 
Q. So you really relied on Mr. Buck's judgment 
as to what to do with it, didn't you? 
A. 'Vell, yes: I would, definitely, in that case. 
(Tr. 73-74 
Mr. Buck testified: 
Q. Calling your attention to an offer for !ht 
purchase of the tavern which was referred !n 
two or three days ago in the testimony - a1! 
offer of $50,000-did you ever have a bona fidt 
offer of $50,000 for the purchase of the tavern' 
A. A bona fide off er? 
Q. Yes; good-faith offer? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have anv idea where this $50,001' 
offer ca~e from or h~w this arose-how the irle. 
came about? 
A. It was just frivolous talk. 
* * 32 * 
Q. Did he deposit any earnest money? 
A. Not a penny. 
* * * 
Q. Did he ever come back and make further 
offers to purchase it? 
A. No. (Tr. 350-351) 
There seems to be no real question about the fact 
that plaintiff did not have anything to do with the acqui-
sition or reinvestment of the stocks. She stated none 
of her own funds were invested in any of the property 
(Tr. 40). That Mr. Buck bought the stocks (Tr. 25). 
That testimony, together with that of Mr. Buck (Tr. 
306) and that of Mr. Healy (Tr. 438, 439), should set 
that matter at rest. That the great majority of the 
money from the Buckeroo was used as living expenses 
is sustained by testimony at pages 208, 209, 210 of the 
transcript. 
In answer to plaintiff's Point VIII, it is to be 
noted that the total acquisition cost of the properties in 
evidence amounted to $108,200.88 (Tr. 307). Of this 
amount $70,385.92 has been traced to the assets and 
business acumen of Mr. Buck. The difference, viz. 
$37,815.96 came from the profits of the business (Tr. 
328) (Exhibits 15-D, 16-D, and the income tax re-
turns). 
YVHAT PART OF THIS $37,000 IS 
TRACEABLE TO THE EFFORTS OF 
PLAINTIFF - FOR SHE ~IADE NO MONE-
TARY CONTRIBUTION? 
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For, if plaintiff can recover at all, she will do so on 
the value of her contribution in acquisitive effort. It ii 
submitted that her efforts toward the acquisition ol 
this money compared to the efforts of l\ir. Buck werr 
small indeed. 
Plaintiff makes a point that Exhibit 15-D show, 
more of an income to defendant than do his income ta.\ 
returns. Plaintiff errs in not realizing that the deprecia· 
tion on the Long Beach property, which served as a tai 
deduction, would be a direct addition to the income, ana 
it is submitted that 15-D accurately reflects the figure, 
on the income tax returns. It is also to be noted tlrn' 
the amount of money paid out by Mr. Buck for tnt 
support of his son by a prior marriage was reflecteii 
directly back into his income through a tax exemption. 
(Income tax returns) 
'Vith reference to the value of the business, lDt 
testimony is that the license under which Mr. Bm: 
operated and was operating at the time of the trial,,,, 
not transferrable -he couldn't sell it; that he was fore~ 
to pay an exorbitant price for the real property in ordt 
to stay in business ( Tr. 304 ) , and that the additior· 
to the tavern were necessary. But in the final analysi1 
the business has no market value other than the red 
property on which it stands; his beer license is not tram 
ferrable (Tr. 317). In addition, there is no eviden11 
that the automobile has a value of $7,800.00. 
'Vith respect to the bank account of approximate] 
$9,000.00, this was money which came to the defendau 
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after plaintiff left him on October 8, 1964, and the court 
found, and rightly so, that plaintiff had nothing what-
ever to do with the business after she left (Tr. 364, 
Memorandum Decisions). 
Plaintiff, in her Point V, makes some point about 
the stocks being in joint tenancy. The plain answer to 
that is that ~Ir. Buck thought the plaintiff was his 
wife; that he was mistaken, and that he would not have 
placed any property in joint tenancy but for the fact 
that he did think the plaintiff was his wife, and to keep 
peace at home (Tr. 342 through 344). 
Plaintiff, at the trial and in her brief, made much of 
defendant's drinking and attempted to show that de-
fendant's drinking accounted for a great waste of assets. 
The testimony does not support her attempt, and it ap-
pears apparent that the Trial Judge didn't believe her, 
and I might add, the wise financial management with 
which defendant made money does not countenance such 
a claim. It is submitted that the following itself is a 
complete answer to any such inflammatory claims. Un-
der cross-examination, the defendant testified: 
Q. 'Vho has made the purchases of the whiskey 
that you have consumed? 
A. I have. 
Q. 'V ould you have an estimate as to how much 
you have spent per week? 
A. I couldn't even guess. "\Vhen you say "A 
great deal of whiskey," now, there has been 
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months and months and years that I haren'! 
drank. 
I have friends that, at the Elks Club, I wai 
there eight years before they knew I took a drink. 
I ordered one drink, and he says-my friewl 
says, "I never knew you drank." 
I have had bar-tenders that worked for me for 
years without knowing I drank. 
This is just a great exaggeration. If I dranl 
a tenth as much booze as I have heard here in 
Court, we wouldn't have this dough to argue 
about. 
I am not an alcoholic in that sense, at all. 
but I have, a couple of times, through aggra· 
vation and arguments with her, overdrank. 
But that's been for a week; not for eight weeki 
-and twice-not over-in nineteen years. 
(Tr. 381-382: 
'Vith reference to plaintiff-appellant's Point IX 
and her proposed accounting, it appears that the on!:. 
other observations about its accuracy that need be maa: 
are: 
'\Vhere does it show the earning power of Mr. Buck· 
capital contribution, and where does it show that plai11• 
tiff-appellant made any contribution? Where does ir 
show the relative contributions in acquisitive effort? Ho1 
did plaintiff-appellant build this estate? 
While accountings in matters such as these do no: 
lend themselves to the precision of a mortgage note. tl11 
following accounting is offered as being commensura11 
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with the facts to a degree unattainable by either plain-
tiff-appellant's accounting or that of the lower court. 
ACCOUNTING 
1. Stocks $107,435.00 
2. Business & Realty & 
Additions 
3. Residence 
4. Duplex 
G. Additions to Buckeroo 
6. Automobile 
7. Bank account 
When plaintiff left this 
is the amount that was 
in the bank 
8. Undeposited dividends 
Sa. Deposited dividends 
$1,862.00, but came after 
plaintiff's departure 
34,500.00 
14.500.00 
7,000.00 
0.00 
4,000.00 
74.00 
0.00 
9. Net income since Oct., 1964 0.00 
Total Worth $167,509.00 
(Tr. 304-317) 
(Tr. 348, 349) 
(Tr. 350) 
J'fo reference on Tr. 237 
See No. 2 supra 
(Tr. 267) Only evidence 
(Tr. 358) The money, 
testified on Tr. 261, 
came after plaintiff's 
departure and she did 
nothing toward its 
acquisition 
No evidence of this. 
Plaintiff's reference to 
Tr. 236 is error 
(Tr. 258, 268) 
Any income to which 
plaintiff would have a 
claim would be income 
which she helped pro-
duce (Tr. 364) 
Acquisition cost of all 
assets 108,200.88 (Tr. 307) 
Funds contributed: 
Defendant 
Plaintiff 
Funds attributable to 
70,386.01 (Tr. 328) 
0.00 
profits from business $ 37,815.87 
What ratio does the contribution in funds by Mr. 
Buck bear to the total acquisition cost? 
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Defendant: 65%, or $70,386.01 Plaintiff: o.o;~ 
The plaintiff's contribution in acquisitive effort, if 
any, is represented in a portion of the balance of $37,-
814.87, which is the remaining 35% of the acquisition 
cost. What portion 1 
Plaintiff: 17.4 % ------·--------- $ 6,579. 79 
Defendant: 82.6% ------------·- $31,235.08 
Mr. Buck testified (Tr. 325, 326, 327) as to tht 
amount of work each put in at the tavern, and the cred1. 
bility of this testimony is supported by that of othe1 
witnesses (Tr. 395, 397, 399, 404, 408, 417, 419, 42f. 
434, 442, 443, 444, 449, 450), and not discounted any-
where except by plaintiff when she said, in exaggeration 
(it is suggested) that she worked more than Mr. Buel 
(Tr. 55). 
His testimony shows: 
Plaintiff worked: 
1946-53 about 20 hours per week 
1953-59 about 10 hours per week 
1959-64 about 5 hours per week 
Total hours plaintiff worked: 35 hours 
Defendant worked: 
1946-53 about 70 hours per week 
1953-59 about 67 hours per week 
1959-64 about 64 hours per week 
Total hours defendant worked: 201 hours 
1964-66, again, 70 hours per week 
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The ratio of plaintiff's effort at the tavern to that 
of Mr. Buck's is 17.4% - applied to that portion of 
the cost of acquisition not attributable to the contribu-
tion in money, and this assumes, to plaintiff's benefit, 
that her effort was as productive as his, which, defendant 
suggests, it certainly was not. It shows plaintiff's effort 
produced $6,579. 79. 
35 Plaintiff: 17.4% 
-- equals .174 
201 Defendant: 82.6% 
Therefore, 65 % of the value of the assets is attrib-
utable to the money contribution of Mr. Buck alone, 
and 35 3 of the value of the assets to the contribution 
i.n effort of both parties. 
Value of assets 
Less 65% (attributable to Mr. 
Buck's contribution in funds) 
$167,509.00 
108,870.85 
35% in value of the assets purchased 
from the profits of the business $ 53,638.15 
Plaintiff: 17 .47r of $58,638.15 
Defendant: 82.6'7c of $68,638.15 
RECAPITULATION 
Total estate 
Total estate attributable to money 
contribution of Mr. Buck $108 870 gr:: Tot~! contribution in effort ' · 0 
attributable to Mr. Buck 48,435.11 
Total effort and capital contribu-
tion of Mr. Buck 
Total. est~te attributable to money 
~ontnbutioi:i of. plaintiff-appellant 0 00 
otal contribution in effort . 
attributable to plaintiff-appellant 1 0,203.04 
rota! effort and capital contribu-
1on of plaintiff-appellant 
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$ 10,203.04 
48,435.11 
$ 58,638.15 
$167,509.00 
157,305.96 
10,203.04 
$167,509.00 
A salient fact to be considered in relation to the 
acquisition of the property here in question is that of 
l\'Ir. Buck's wise financial management (Tr. 301, 302, 
363). 
CONCLUSION 
Toward the acquisition of the property, plaintiff. 
appellant contributed no funds, and she contribute1J 
relatively little effort. There were no children, and sht 
kept house for herself and Mr. Buck. She was well· 
maintained and liberally supplied with money and e11-
tertainment. She supplied no separate funds and did rn1 
work at any outside employment. 
Toward the acquisition of the property, .l\Ir. Buci 
contributed funds amounting to $70,386.01, and he con· 
tributed relatively large effort. There were no children 
He managed the business and the investments and tool 
care of the yard and house at the residence. Hem, 
well-maintained and liberally supplied with money auL 
entertainment through his own efforts and capital. H' 
supplied separate funds and was the manager and cl11t: 
worker in the business and the sole manager of ti:: 
investments. 
Therefore, in view of the well-settled law in a1 
jurisdictions where the common law is the rule fr.: 
decision, where the courts uniformly hold that an equ: 
table division of the property acquired during a voii 
marriage shall be made upon a determination of th 
proportionate contributions of the parties thereto, an, 
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that contributions are defined in terms of money and 
acquisitiYe effort; it is submitted that the award to 
plaintiff-appellant is an abuse of discretion, and exceeds 
by more than $20,000 the amount to which she is equi-
tably entitled. 
Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant re-
spectfully submits that this Honorable Court award to 
Plaintiff-Appellant not more than the total sum of 
$10,203.04, without interest, and that it quiet title to 
the remaining property in him. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
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